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Whether  discretionary  fiscal  policies  in  industrialized  countries  act  counter   or 
pro cyclically and whether their reaction is symmetric or asymmetric over the cycle are still 
largely unsettled questions. This uncertainty remains even when attention is restricted to euro 
area countries, where these questions have important implications for the debate on European 
fiscal rules. We review the recent empirical literature to explain why the results of the various 
studies differ so greatly. We find that differences are driven partly by the choices made in 
modelling fiscal behaviour and in the related notions of fiscal policy cyclicality. Results are 
also affected by data source and vintage (ex post or real time). The time period chosen is 
relatively  less  important.  We  conclude  that the  notion  of  pro cyclical  fiscal  policies  often 
upheld in the debate is not justified by the data. Ex post data suggest either a cyclicality or 
weak counter cyclicality. Real time information gives clearer indications of counter cyclical 
behaviour, especially when we progress from a very simple “core” model to a more complex 
one, including at least the impact of fiscal rules. As for symmetry or asymmetry, the answer 
varies with sources of data and time periods. With the more complex model the indications of 
asymmetric behaviour are more robust. Whenever asymmetry is present, it entails shifts in all 
the parameters of the fiscal rule and not necessarily in the output gap parameter. 
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1.  Introduction 
Whether  discretionary  fiscal  policies  in  industrialized  countries  act  counter   or 
pro cyclically and whether their reaction is symmetric or asymmetric over the cycle are still 
largely unsettled questions. They are important for a variety of reasons. First, answering them 
would  enhance  our  understanding  of  past  developments  and,  more  generally,  of 
macroeconomic fluctuations, with potential implications on the debate concerning the right 
model to account for them. Second, clarifying the actual behaviour of governments would 
represent a useful reference point for the theoretical debate, which is on going since at least 
the Thirties but has become intense in recent years, on the need and scope for counter cyclical 
stabilization policies. Finally, these answers represent a necessary starting point for proposals 
concerning fiscal rules and institutional reforms. The latter point is particularly relevant in the 
European context, where fiscal policy remains the only instrument against asymmetric shocks, 
since the use of monetary and exchange rate policies is no longer an option for individual 
countries. 
Over the last decades, several empirical works have analysed the behaviour of budgetary 
policies over the cycle in industrialized countries. Focusing on relatively recent works and 
excluding studies concerned with individual economies, we reviewed a group of 21 studies, all 
either assessing the fiscal behaviour of EMU countries or presenting results for a group of 
countries where EMU countries are prominent.
1 While many studies conclude that policies 
tended to be pro cyclical, there are almost as many pointing to a cyclicality and a few suggest 
that policies were counter cyclical. Furthermore, little consensus seems to exist on whether the 
behaviour has been symmetrical over good and bad times. 
We then restricted our analysis to a more homogeneous subset of 12 studies that share 
the following characteristics: they include the output gap in levels as indicator of cyclical 
conditions and they measure discretionary policies (implicitly or explicitly) on the basis of the 
change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. 
On the basis of the first condition, we excluded from our analysis 7 studies
2 that include 
growth or similar measures (change in the output gap, difference between growth and trend 
                                                                          
1  We restrictied our attention to the studies that focus on industrialized countries. The prominent role of EMU 
countries in the sample is also a reflection of the availability of the data. 
2  Fatás and Mihov, 2002; von Hagen, Hallett and Strauch, 2002; Hallerberg and Strauch, 2002; Lane, 2003; 
Melitz, 2000; Mink and De Haan, 2006; OECD, 2003. 4 
growth) as indicators of cyclical conditions. The choice of the output gap in levels focuses on 
whether the position of the economy is above or below its trend (potential) level and on its 
distance from it, while the reference to growth or similar measures focuses on whether the 
economy is in an upturn or in a downturn and its intensity. It is outside the scope of this paper 
to judge which cyclical indicator is preferable.
3 We restricted our attention to the first group of 
studies as they represent the majority view in the literature on this issue.
4 On the basis of the 
second condition we excluded two studies,
5 which rely on a different concept of discretionary 
action. 
Even this set of 12 studies shows results that fully span the range of positions expressed 
in the whole literature. Table 1 reports, for each of these 12 studies, the indication concerning 
the sign and the symmetry of the reaction of discretionary policies to cyclical conditions and 
some characteristics of the specific regression we refer to. 
There are many factors that could plausibly explain the differences in the results. The 
studies  differ  in  several  respects:  the  model  of  used  policy  decisions,  the  estimation 
procedures, the countries included in the sample, the analyzed periods of time, the sources of 
data (including different vintages of data from the same source). 
In this paper we try to disentangle the relative role of these factors. However, we do not 
examine the role of slight variations in the specific countries included in the different samples. 
We  base  our  analysis  on  data  for  a  group  of  11  EMU  countries  (only  Luxembourg  and 
Slovenia are excluded for lack of data).
6 
In Section 2 we assess the impact of the different choices in modelling fiscal behaviour. 
Abstracting from a number of specific characteristics pertaining to the individual analyses, in 
the 12 studies we find three basic specifications of the fiscal policy reaction function. We 
show that these three fiscal rules – which include among regressors only the initial conditions 
                                                                          
3  Both indicators carry useful information. In our opinion, they largely complement each other. 
4  The literature on the cyclicality of US budgetary policies generally focuses on the output gaps in levels or on 
similar indicators (Auerbach, 2002; Bohn, 1998; Cohen and Follette, 2003; Taylor, 2000). 
5  Buti and van den Noord (2004) construct an indicator for discretionary policies which aims to control for 
errors in forecasting. Giuliodori and Beetsma (2006), in a paper largely devoted to gauge the relevance of 
fiscal policy interdipendence in the European Union, estimate a fiscal rule that uses real time data for the 
regressors. Concerning the dependent variable, instead of focusing on the effects of actual policies (proxied 
by the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance, CAPB henceforth, measured ex post) the authors 
point out that the latter are “polluted” with the reactions to events that take place after the budget is finalized 
and focus on government plans (proxied by the OECD forecast one year ahead for the CAPB). 
6  In Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) we find that the fiscal behaviour over the cycle of the group of OECD 
countries outside EMU for which data of sufficient time length are available (US, Japan, Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, UK, Sweden and Denmark) is significantly different from that of EMU countries. 5 
of public finances (debt and deficit) and the output gap – embody different notions of fiscal 
policy cyclicality and may lead to different interpretations of the policy behaviour. In our 
opinion, there is often insufficient awareness of these issues when the estimates of the output 
gap parameter of the different studies are used in the policy debate.
7 
In  the  following  Sections  3 4  we  focus  on  the  first  model,  having  shown  that  it  is 
possible to approximately recover from its estimates those based on the other two models. In 
Section 3 we examine the impact of time period, source and type of data (real time or ex post) 
on the estimates of the fiscal reaction to cyclical conditions. We estimate rolling regressions 
with a fixed 15 year window over the period 1978 2006 for four alternative datasets: three are 
based on ex post data sources (OECD, AMECO, OECD data for primary deficit and debt with 
Hodrick Prescott filter estimates of the output gap) and the fourth largely on real time data 
(taken  from  Golinelli  and  Momigliano,  2006),  available  only  for  the  reduced  1988 2006 
period.  Results  show  that  the  different  data  sources,  even  within  the  ex  post  data  sets, 
determine sizeable shifts in the estimates of the output gap parameter. Independently of the 
data source, a slight tendency towards a pro cyclical (or a less counter cyclical) behaviour 
emerges over time. 
In Section 4 we examine the impact of the same factors (time period, source and type of 
data) on determining whether fiscal policies have been symmetrical or asymmetrical over the 
cycle. We find contrasting results, depending on both ex post data sources and sample periods. 
Results  suggest  that  the  asymmetric  behaviour  of  the  discretionary  policy,  when  present, 
entails shifts in all the parameters of the rule and not only in the output gap parameter. 
In  Section  5  we  extend  the  basic  fiscal  rule  adding,  when  feasible,  the  additional 
variables found significant in the 12 studies we focus on. While there is a remarkable increase 
of the explanatory power of the model, the results broadly confirm the conclusions reached in 
Sections 3 4. The only important differences are the following: a) policy asymmetry is found 
for all data sources; b) the evidence of counter cyclical behaviour with real time data becomes 
clearer. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                                          
7  The same modelling choices are also followed in other areas of the literature on fiscal policy behaviour, for 
example that focusing on developing countries. 6 
2.  Modelling choices 
If we focus on the “core” components of the fiscal rule – the dependent variable and the 
initial conditions of public finances – in the restricted set of 12 studies, we find three basic 
specifications of fiscal behaviour. None of the three specifications do justice to the richness of 
the studies we review, which often devote large part of their attention to determinants different 
from  cyclical  conditions.  Nevertheless  the  analysis  of  the  three  models  contributes 
significantly, in our opinion, to understand why there is no consensus on this issue in the 
literature. 
2.1  The three models 
Most  studies  estimate  what  we  call  a  “CAPB  Model”  fiscal  rule,  in  which  the 
discretionary fiscal action, measured by the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(  CAPB),
8 is explained by the initial state of public finances (measured by the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance and the debt of general government) and the cyclical conditions 
(measured by the level of the output gap): 
    CAPBi t = f
C
capb CAPB i t–1 + f
C
debt DEBT i t–1+ f
C
gap GAPi (t or t–1) + ui t  [1] 
The  stability  of  equation  [1]  requires  that  f
C
capb  be  negative  and  f
C
debt  positive.  A 
positive value of f
C
gap indicates a counter cyclical policy, while a negative value points to pro 
cyclicality. Some of the studies include the simultaneous output gap (i.e. at time t, the year in 
which budgetary actions have their effects); others include the lagged output gap (i.e. at time 
t–1, the year in which budgetary decisions are taken). The two variants of the CAPB Model 
(henceforth “CAPB-s Model” and “CAPB-l Model”, respectively) lead to similar results (as 
we show in Section 3) since the values of the output gap are highly persistent.
9 Finally, the 
                                                                          
8  Some authors, among which Galí and Perotti (2003), use as dependent variable the level of the CAPB, instead 
of  its  change.  This  specification  is  equivalent  to  that  of  eq.[1],  as  it  gives  the  same  estimates  for  all 
coefficients except for that of the lagged dependent variable, for which its estimate is equal to 1 plus the 
estimate obtained with eq.[1]. It is largely a presentational issue, but we tend to prefer the specification in 
changes (eq. [1]) mainly because the explanatory power of the model and of the statistical significance of the 
coefficient of the lagged deficit are not artificially inflated by the component attributable to inertia (which, in 
turn, is largely an unexplained phenomenon). 
9  The variable GAPi  t–1  is  a plausible  alternative  to GAPit,  as policy makers  may  react  to  current  cyclical 
conditions or use them to forecast cyclical conditions in the following year. The inertia and complexity of the 
decision making process may also justify the reference to the lagged output gap. A purely statistical reason 
for preferring GAP i t–1 instead of GAP i t is that the latter requires recourse to instrumental variables, as the 
output gap is affected by fiscal policy, which opens up a number of equally acceptable alternatives with 
potential effects on the results. 7 
unobservable term ui t = mi + lt + ei t may include (depending on the study) individual (mi), time 
(lt) and random (ei t) components. 
In a few studies authors estimate a broadly similar model, but assume that policy makers 
react with a lag to the primary balance (PB t–1) rather than to the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB t–1), as in the CAPB Model. Henceforth, we call this fiscal rule “CAPB/PB 
Model”: 
    CAPB i t = f
C/P
pb PB i t–1 + f
C/P
i debt DEBTi t–1 + f
C/P
gap GAP i (t or t–1) + ui t  [2] 
The CAPB Model and the CAPB/PB Model are probably equally plausible. The CAPB 
Model is consistent with a fiscal rule where automatic stabilizers are left to operate fully (as 
discretionary  actions  do  not  react  with  a  lag  to  their  impact  on  the  balance).  This  policy 
indication is very common in policy documents at the European level, especially after 1997, 
when the Stability and Growth Pact was introduced. CAPB/PB Model may be seen as more 
realistic, as policy makers may be more concerned with headline figures; moreover, especially 
in the 1970s and 1980s, data on cyclically adjusted balances were not available and even the 
concept of cyclical adjustment was not widespread. 
Finally, other studies, which essentially focus on the issue of asymmetry in budgetary 
reactions, adopt a fiscal rule in which, compared with the CAPB/PB Model, the dependent 
variable     CAPBit–1  is  substituted  by     PBit–1
10  Henceforth,  we  call  this  specification 
“PB Model”: 
    PBi t = f
P
pb PBi t–1 + f
P
debt DEBTi t–1 + f
Pgap GAPi (t or t–1) + ui t  [3] 
The PB Model assumes a behaviour of fiscal authorities significantly different from that 
of the other two models, as the policy decision (dependent variable) includes the effects of 
both the discretionary actions and the automatic stabilizers.
11 This is shown by identity [4], in 
which the primary balance is decomposed into the cyclically adjusted primary balance and in a 
                                                                          
10  In the studies, the level of the PB, instead of its change, is used as dependent variable. As already mentioned 
in the case of the CAPB Model, this specification is equivalent to that of equation [3], as it gives the same 
estimates for all coefficients except for that of the lagged dependent variable, for which its estimate is equal to 
1 plus the estimate obtained with equation [3]. 
11  There is an important difference between CAPB and CAPB/PB Models on one side and the PB Model on the 
other concerning the dependent variable, which suggests more caution when interpreting the results of the PB 
Model in terms of behaviour of fiscal authorities when ex post data are used. In the CAPB and CAPB/PB 
Models it can be assumed that budget authorities are able to predict fairly accurately the effects of their 
discretionary actions, as the latter are in principle largely independent of cyclical conditions. In Model PB, 
instead, the change in the balance is not independent from the output gap. 8 
cyclical component, equal to the product of the output gap and a coefficient ωi t capturing the 
effects of automatic stabilizers. 
  PBi t º CAPBi t + ωi t GAPi t  [4] 
The  results  in  these  studies  have  been  used  to  identify  the  cyclical  reaction  of 
discretionary policies by subtracting from the estimated coefficient of the output gap (f
P
gap) an 
average value (ω) of the individual coefficients ωi t (which is generally assessed for the EMU 





gap - ω  [5] 
The use of an average value is justified by evidence of a limited variability across countries 
and  time  of  the  coefficients  capturing  the  effects  of  the  automatic  stabilizers  (see,  e.g., 
Girouard and André, 2006). 
2.2  Estimating the three models 
In Table 2a we present estimates of the coefficient of the output gap based on the three 
models for the two variants (which include, respectively, the simultaneous and the lagged 
output gap). As most of the reviewed studies, we use ex post data. The source is OECD for all 
data except for public debt; for this variable, as OECD data are incomplete, the source is the 
AMECO database.
12 The full 1978 2006 sample is used. 
Since all specifications are dynamic panels and embody fixed country effects (mi), their 
parameters are estimated by one step GMM sys (see Blundell and Bond, 1998), using only a 
subset of the potentially available instrument matrix: the t–2 and t–3 lags of the debt, of the 
output gap and of the primary balance.
13 The use of GMM sys, compared to OLS, avoids 
estimation biases. Compared to other instrumental variable estimators, such as the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) GMM dif, GMM sys is potentially less affected by the problem of weak 
instruments, i.e. scarcely correlated with the variables to be instrumented, as is typical with 
persistent data such as debt or the output gap (see Celasun and Kang, 2006, for a thorough 
                                                                          
12  Primary borrowing and debt are expressed as ratios of potential GDP. 
13  Omitting from the instruments the more distant lags does usually entail a limited loss of information. On the 
other side, it has been often pointed out that using too many instruments can significantly reduce the power of 
the Sargan test in finite samples (see, e.g., Bond, 2002). 9 
discussion of alternative estimators in the context of fiscal reaction funtions).
14 Our preference 
for  GMM sys  is  also  supported  by  the  results  reported  in  the  Appendix,  where  the 
performance of alternative estimators is reported. 
Contrary to the most common practice of the reviewed studies, time effects (lt) are 
allowed (in all regressions presented in Table 2a they are found to be jointly significant). We 
include the time dummies (accounting for effects that are almost invariant to all countries and 
change over time) as, hopefully, they can reduce the omitted variable bias stemming from the 
very simple specifications we are using.
15 
Four results stand out, which are largely independent of the sample used and the source 
of data: 
(a)  The estimates of the cyclical reaction using the CAPB/PB Model tend to indicate a more 
counter cyclical behaviour than those of the CAPB Model. 
(b)  The estimates of the cyclical reaction based on the PB Model are relatively close to those 
of  the  other  two  models.  This  result  is  rather  surprising.  We  would  expect  a  large 
difference  (close  to  0.5)  because  the  estimated  coefficient  of  the  PB  Model  should 
include, in principle, also the effects of automatic stabilizers. 
(c)  The  estimates  of  the  parameters  of  the  initial  fiscal  conditions  (debt  and  deficit)  are 
largely constant across the three models, notwithstanding the fact that only in the CAPB 
Model the lagged deficit is cyclically adjusted. 
(d)  The  estimates  of  almost  all  parameters  are  not  significantly  affected  by  the  choice 
between  the  simultaneous  and  the  lagged  output  gap  (this  emerges  by  comparing  the 
coefficients  in  columns  1 3  with  the  corresponding  ones  in  columns  4 6);  the  only 
(partial) exception is the estimate of the cyclical reaction measured by the PB Model. 
Result (d), as already mentioned, reflects the high persistence of the output gap. In the 
following two sections we explain the other results. 
                                                                          
14  In Hayakawa (2007), it is analytically shown that in finite samples GMM sys is less biased than GMM dif, 
even though it uses more instruments. However, as shown by the simulations reported in Bun and Kiviet 
(2006), the ranking of the alternative estimators depends on the specific model and characteristics of data. 
15  Allowing time dummies determines a non negligeable shift of all estimates of the cyclical reaction towards 
counter cyclicality (Table 2a reports the results of the specifications without time dummies). We interpret this 
result, in line with the argument stated in the main text, as reflecting an omitted variable bias in the coefficient 
of the output gap. This interpretation is supported by the fact that broadly the same shift towards counter 
cyclicality in the estimates of the cyclical reaction occurs when we add additional variables (see section 5). 10 
2.3  Comparing Model CAPB and Model CAPB/PB 
Starting from the CAPB l Model (i.e. equation [1], in the variant which includes the 
lagged  output  gap)  we  subtract  and  add  f
C–l
capb  ωi  t–1  GAPi  t–1  on  the  right  side  of  the 
expression. Using also identity [4], we obtain the following equation, in which the CAPB/PB l 
Model is expressed in terms of the CAPB l Model parameters: 
  CAPBi t = f
C–l
capb PB i t–1 + f
C–l




capb ´ ωi t–1) GAPi t–1 + ui t  [6] 
By comparing equation [6] with the CAPB/PB l Model (i.e. equation [2], in the variant 











debt  [7b] 











pb ´ ω)  [7c] 
The first two equivalences indicate that in the CAPB and CAPB/PB Models the effects 
of the initial fiscal conditions (notwithstanding the different choice regarding the balance) are 
measured  by  the  same  parameters.  The  third  relationship,  which  is  not  exact  because  we 
substitute the time  and country specific coefficients measuring the effects of the automatic 
stabilizers ωi t–1 with their average value ω, indicates that the reaction to cyclical conditions 
estimated  in  the  CAPB/PB  Model  is  approximately  equal  to  f
C–l
gap  (which  measures  the 
estimate of the reaction in the CAPB Model) minus the product of ω and the coefficient for the 
lagged deficit. 
This  latter  component  is  negative,  since  ω  >  0  (otherwise,  the  automatic  budgetary 




capb < 0 (otherwise, we would observe 
exploding  deficits).  Therefore,  the  estimates  of  the  coefficient  of  the  output  gap  in  the 
CAPB/PB l  Model  are  systematically  more  counter cyclical  than  those  obtained  using  the 
CAPB l Model. On the basis of the estimated parameters of the regression for the CAPB/PB l 
Model in Table 2a, the difference stemming from the modelling choice is 0.08, about twice the 
standard deviation of the estimate for the coefficient. A similar difference can be found when 
comparing the CAPB s Model with the CAPB/PB s Model. 
The explanation of the result obtained above is rather intuitive. Compared to the CAPB 
Model,  in  the  CAPB/PB  Model  discretionary  policies  react  to  the  lagged  effects  of  the 11 
automatic stabilizers on the budget (with the same coefficient of their reaction to the lagged 
cyclically adjusted deficit). This additional reaction, which is stabilizing with respect to public 
finances, is pro cyclical and determines (compared to the CAPB Model) a corresponding shift 
towards counter cyclicality in the estimate of the coefficient of the output gap. 
Summing up, CAPB and CAPB/PB Models are basically a re parameterization of one 
another (as such, data cannot discriminate between them) and lead to different estimates only 
for the parameter of the output gap. The differences in the latter can be attributed to a different 
notion of cyclicality (net or gross of the reaction to the lagged effects of automatic stabilizers). 
In the lower part of Table 2a we present the estimate of f
C–l
gap obtained using the parameters 
estimated with the CAPB/PB Model and the approximated relationship [7c]. The results are 
almost identical to the estimates based on the CAPB Model, suggesting that the relationship is 
validated by actual data. 
2.4  Interpreting the cyclical reaction parameter in Model PB 
We add to both sides of the CAPB/PB s Model (i.e. eq. [2] in the variant that includes 
the simultaneous output gap) the effects of the automatic stabilizers (  [ωi t GAPi t]). Using 
also identity [4], we obtain the following equation: 
  PBi t = f
C/P
pb PB i t–1 + f
C/P
i debt DEBTi t–1 + (f
C/P
gap + ωi t–1) GAPi t – ωi t GAPi t–1 + ui t  [8] 
Eq. [8] differs from the PB s Model by the presence of the last term (– ωi t GAPi t–1). It 
shows that if we could omit that term, directly estimating the discretionary cyclical reaction in 
the CAPB/PB s Model would be approximately equivalent to subtracting ω from the estimate of 
the cyclical reaction in the PB s Model (the two alternatives are not exactly equivalent because 
we treat ω as a constant). 
We can disregard the last term of eq. [8] only if we can assume that it is uncorrelated 
with  all  the  other  regressors.  However,  the  very  notion  of  economic  cycle  implies  the 
correlation over time of the output gap. If we assume the autocorrelation coefficient r = 1, so 
that GAPi t = GAPi t–1 + vi t and ωi t = ωi t–1, we obtain the following equation: 
    PB i t = f
C/P
pb PB i t–1 + f
C/P
i debt DEBTi t–1+ (f
C/P
gap) GAPi t + ui t  [9] 12 
Eq. [9] shows that under these assumptions the estimate of the output gap parameter of 
the CAPB/PB s Model is identical to that of the PB s Model.
16 
As  noted,  the  output  gap  is  highly  persistent,  with  values  of  the  autocorrelation 
coefficient r for the different data sources ranging between 0.8 and 0.9. This behaviour (a 
quasi random walk) intuitively explains our findings in section 2.2 that the estimates of the 
cyclical reaction in the PB model are relatively close to those of the CAPB/PB Model. 
Sustituting GAPi  t with r GAP  i  t–1, with a few simple manipulations we can obtain 
approximate relationships between the parameters of the PB Model and those of the CAPB 
Model. The effects of the initial fiscal conditions are measured by approximately the same 
parameters  (an  exact  equivalence  was  found  in  section  2.3  for  the  CAPB  and  CAPB/PB 
models).  The  approximate  relationship  between  the  coefficients  measuring  the  reaction  to 







pb ´ ω) + ((1 – r) ´ ω)  [10]
 
In  the  lower  part  of  Table  2a  we  present  the  estimate  of  f
C–l
gap  obtained  using  the 
parameters estimated with the PB Model and eq. [10]. As in the similar exercise described in 
section 2.3, the results are very close to the estimate based on the CAPB Model, suggesting 
that eq. [10] is validated by actual data. 
Summing up, if the output gap has low autocorrelation the estimate of the output gap 
parameter of the PB Model differs from that of the CAPB/PB Model by approximately the 
value of ω. The two estimates are therefore consistent, taking into account eq. [5]. If the output 
gap has high autocorrelation, which is our case, the two estimates are instead relatively close. 
In this case, using eq. [5] (i.e. subtracting ω from the PB Model estimate) leads to a large 
difference  in  the  cyclical  reaction  attributed  to  discretionary  policy,  with  the  PB  Model 
suggesting  a  much  more  pro cyclical  (or  a  much  less  counter cyclical)  policy  than  the 
CAPB/PB Model (or the CAPB Model). The difference can be as large as 0.5, or twelve times 
the standard deviation of the estimates. 
The assessment of the cyclical reaction of discretionary policies based on the PB Model 
and eq. [5] can be considered as reflecting a third notion of cyclicality. 
                                                                          
16  If the output gap behaves as a random walk, adding (or subtracting) the effects of the automatic stabilizers 
from the dependent variable has no impact on the estimates because in that case   (ωi t GAPi t) collapses into 
the unpredictable noise vit, which simply inflates the random component ui t. 13 
It is hard to judge, and it is outside the scope of this paper, whether the PB model is a 
better  description  of  policy  choices  than  the  other  two.  In  particular,  there  is  no  clear 
difference in the performance of the three models (as shown in Table 2a) and all lack a fully 
satisfactory theoretical underpinning. Nevertheless, the first two models appear to be more 
direct solutions for the specific aim of gauging the cyclicality of discretionary policies and 
they are used in most of the works covered in our review of the literature. We therefore use the 
notions of cyclicality embodied in them in assessing the empirical results in the rest of the 
paper. 
 
3.  Time periods and sources of data 
In this section we assess to what extent the estimates of the fiscal rule depend on the 
source of data (OECD against European Commission, henceforth EC), on the data vintage 
(ex post against real time), and on the estimation period. We focus on the CAPB Model. In the 
initial part of the analysis we provide additional evidence of the broad equivalence between 
the results based on the CAPB s and CAPB l Models. Henceforth, we present results only for 
the CAPB l Model. We include, when jointly significant, fixed time effects. 
To avoid repetitions we do not estimate the CAPB/PB and PB Models. The results for 
these models are approximately equal to those of the CAPB Model for all parameters except 
for  the  one  assessing  the  cyclical  reaction.  To  recover  the  estimates  of  the  output  gap 
parameter of the CAPB/PB l Model, (using the approximate relationship [7c]) those of the 
CAPB l Model need to be shifted upward (toward counter cyclicality) by approximately 0.1. 
As for the PB l Model, the estimates of the coefficient (using the approximate relationship 
[10]) tend to be in an intermediate position between those of the other two models.
17 
Figure  1a  compares  across  different  samples  (obtained  by  rolling  regressions  with a 
fixed  window  of  15  years  over  1978 2006)  the  GMM sys  estimated  (see  Section  2.2) 
parameters  using  the  CAPB s  Model  with  those  using  the  CAPB l  Model,  obtained  with 
OECD ex post data. In this figure, four graphs are reported. The two in the upper row and the 
one in the lower left hand allow us to assess the estimates of the parameters of, respectively, 
the lagged deficit (upper left), the lagged debt (upper right), and the output gap (lower left). 
                                                                          
17  As for the variants with simoultaneos output gap, there is approximately the same difference (0.1) between the 
coefficient of the CAPB Model and the CAPB/PB Model, while the estimate of the coefficient of the PB 
Model tend to be close to that of the CAPB/PB Model. 14 
The points of each graph are marked with labels indicating the model used in the estimation 
(CAPB s or CAPB l). Each point corresponds to an estimate obtained over the sub sample 
ending in the year indicated on the horizontal axis and starting 15 years before. For each 
estimation  period, the  95%  confidence  interval  of  the  estimate  obtained  with  the  CAPB s 
Model is plotted. The confidence interval shown in the lower right hand graph is an average of 
the two confidence intervals based on the CAPB s and CAPB l Models; it is centred on zero: 
approximately, the f
A
gap point estimates falling inside this zero interval are not significantly 
different from zero. 
As we found in Tables 2a and 2b, the estimated parameters of both lagged deficit and 
debt, plotted, respectively, in the first row of graphs, are indistinguishable. The f
C
gap point 
estimates of the CAPB l Model (in the lower left hand graph) are always relatively close to 
those of the CAPB s Model and fall well inside their confidence interval. This supports the 
view  (based  on  the  high  persistence  of  the  output  gap)  that  the  two  variants  are 
interchangeable. Finally, in the lower right hand graph, f
C
gap estimates with the CAPB s and 
CAPB l Models both fall inside the average 95% confidence interval, indicating that by using 
ex post OECD data the hypothesis of an a cyclical policy cannot be rejected for all periods. 
Figures 1b 1d compare the CAPB l Model parameter estimates across different samples 
(again obtained by rolling regressions with a fixed 15 year window) for four different data 
sources: OECD ex post data (labelled OECD), OECD ex post data for fiscal variables and 
estimates of the output gap based on ex post GDP and the Hodrick Prescott filter (labelled 
HP), AMECO ex post data (labelled EC) and the real time data computed in Momigliano and 
Golinelli (2006) on the basis of various issues of  the OECD  Economic  Outlook (labelled 
RT).
18 Due to data unavailability, the starting point of the estimates based on real time data is 
1988, which corresponds to 2002 as final year. The structure of Figures 1b 1c is the same as 
the  one  for  Figure  1a.  Figure  1d  focuses  only  on  the  parameter  estimates  of  the  cyclical 
reaction. 
From Figures 1b 1c it emerges that the fcapb and fdebt point estimates are not statistically 
different for all samples and across different data sources and vintages. Instead, differences 
emerge for f
C–s
gap point estimates. As shown in Figure 1d, OECD and HP based estimates 
suggest  an  a cyclical  behaviour;  EC  and  RT  estimates  point  to  a  weak,  generally  not 
significant, counter cyclicality. To translate these results in terms of the notion of cyclicality 
                                                                          
18  As OECD data for public debt are incomplete, for this variable we always use AMECO data. 15 
embodied in the CAPB/PB Model, all f
C–s
gap estimates would need to be shifted upwards 
(towards counter cyclicality) by approximately 0.1. In this case, most EC and RT estimates 
would become significant. 
As the sample moves forward over time, excluding the furthest years and including the 
most recent ones, the estimates shift slightly in the direction of pro cyclicality. This result 
contrasts with other papers, which find a shift from pro cyclicality to a cyclicality after the 
Maastricht Treaty (Wyplosz, 2006; IMF, 2004; Galí and Perotti, 2003). 
In  Table  3  we  report  the  estimation  results  of  the  CAPB l  Model  over  the  fixed 
1988 2006 period
19 for the four different data sources and vintages. In all cases, the usual 
over identifying  restrictions  and  residuals’  autocorrelation  tests  are  always  largely  not 
rejected,  while  the  time  effects  are  always  significant.  The  results  broadly  confirm  the 
indications emerging from Figures 1a 1d. 
Summing up, the results included in this section suggest the following remarks. 
The  significance  of  the  fixed  time  effects  is  a  common  feature  in  all  cases  under 
scrutiny. This fact highlights the need of always including them in order to prevent biased 
estimates due to the omission of relevant factors influencing all countries at the same time 
(e.g. fluctuations in the prices of stocks and oil). 
Independently  of  model,  sample  period,  data  source  and  vintage,  the  initial  fiscal 
conditions (lagged borrowing and debt) always matter. This evidence suggests caution when 
using inferences on the cyclical response of fiscal policies based on models omitting these two 
regressors. 
Findings about cyclical conditions do not enjoy a comparable robustness. Point estimates 
of the cyclical reaction of discretionary policies tend to be influenced (and the sign reversed) 
by the use of alternative data sources and/or vintages. The sample selection is generally less 
important. The overall picture is that of a cyclicality or weak counter cyclicality in ex post 
data and counter cyclicality (significant with the CAPB/PB Model and not significant with the 
CAPB Model) with real time data. 
 
                                                                          
19  The period 1988 2006 corresponds to the largest sample available for real time data. 16 
4.  Policy asymmetries 
Two approaches can be followed when testing for asymmetries in fiscal behaviour. The 
sample can be split into two sub samples (corresponding to “good” and “bad” times) and two 
distinct sets of estimates for the parameters of the fiscal rule are obtained. Alternatively, only 
the fgap parameter can be allowed to vary across the two states of nature. In what follows, we 
refer to the practice of splitting the sample as the “two sample approach” (2SA) and to that of 
splitting only the fgap parameter as the “two parameter approach” (2PA). 
The first approach (2SA) is more general. If all parameters change across states, 2SA 
leads to consistent and efficient estimates of all the parameter shifts, while 2PA estimates are 
biased and inconsistent. If only the parameter fgap shifts, 2SA leads to still consistent but 
inefficient estimates, while 2PA is consistent and efficient. 
In order to conduct efficient inferences with a parsimonious model without imposing 
invalid symmetry restrictions to fcapb and fdebt parameters and to the deterministic components 
of the model, we follow two sequential steps. First, the sample is split, following 2SA, and the 
joint significance of the shifts between states of nature in all model parameters except fgap is 
assessed. Second, if the null (i.e. parameters are symmetrical) of the previous test is rejected, 
the symmetry of the policy reaction to the economic cycle is assessed with the same test but 
including all model parameters. If the null is not rejected, the more efficient 2PA is carried 
out, and the symmetry of the policy reaction to the economic cycle is assessed by testing for 
the significance of the fgap shift between “good” and “bad” times. 
In Figure 2a we present the results for the CAPB l Model
20 of these two sequential steps 
across data sources and vintages and sample periods. In the upper part, we show whether the 
null of symmetry of all model parameters except fgap is rejected (black boxes) or not (grey 
boxes). In the lower part we show whether the null of policy rule symmetry is rejected (black 
boxes)  or  not  (grey  boxes)  by  using  the  most  appropriate  approach  (either  2SA  or  2PA, 
depending on the outcome of the upper part). The two diagrams are identical, indicating that, 
                                                                          
20  CAPB l and CAPB/PB l Models have the advantage, over CAPB s and CAPB/PB s Models, of avoiding the 
risk of biased parameter estimates linked to an endogenous selection of good and bad times. In fact, in order 
to split either the whole sample or only the gap parameter, a zero one indicator variable Ii t must be defined. 
When the cyclical indicator is the output gap in levels, the usual practice is to set Ii t = 1 if GAPi t > 0 (“good 
times”), and Ii t = 0 if GAPi t £ 0 (“bad times”). However, this selection risks being endogenous, given the 
possible simultaneity between the idiosyncratic policy shock ei t (see equations [1] to [3] of Section 2) and the 
actual GAPi  t realisation that drives Ii  t. If such endogeneity occurs, the selection based on the sign of the 
output gap at time t entails biased parameter estimates. 17 
if the first test is not rejected, asymmetry in the cyclical reaction is never found and, if the first 
test is rejected, asymmetry for all parameters, including fgap, is always found. In other terms, 
when asymmetry exists, it always depends on a general shift in parameters of the rule and not 
on a specific shift of fgap. Indeed, when we restrict our attention to the final fgap parameters, 
independently of the result of the first test, they are never significantly different. This is shown 
for the specific period 1988 2006 in Table 4. Another indication emerging from Figure 2a is 
that  the  answer  to  whether  policies  are  symmetrical  or  asymmetrical  varies,  with  ex  post 
information, across data sources and time periods. With real time data, the indication is of 
symmetrical behaviour. 
Figure  2b  plots  the  differences  between  the  f
C
gap  parameter  in  good and  bad  times. 
Though not significant, such differences are aways positive in all the samples ending later than 
1995. A similar indication is also conveyed by the analysis of the constant term across states 
of nature. These results seem at odds the usual interpretation of asymmetry, i.e. that it arises 
because government action is pro cyclical in good times.
21 
In order to give an insight into the level of the alternative f
C
gap estimates, Figure 2b also 
reports two splines representing the yearly average of the f
C
gap parameters in good and bad 
times for the three sources of ex post data (from 1992) and for real time data (from 2002). 
To integrate the analysis carried out in Figures 2a and 2b, in Table 4 we report the 
GMM sys estimates of the CAPB l Model for four alternative data sources and vintages over 
the  same  1988 2006  period.  For  each  source  the  final  outcome  of  the  general to specific 
procedure outlined above is reported. If 2SA is appropriate, the estimates are reported in two 
columns (for good and bad times), while if 2PA proves to be valid, a single column suffices. 
The lower part of Table 4, at the “no switch” row, reports the p value of the test whose 
null admits the restriction from 2SA to 2PA. Results clearly reject the null with EC data and 
with HP data.
22 Results with OECD and RT, instead, do not reject 2PA as a valid reduction of 
2SA. Alone, the shift in the output gap effect is never the main cause of symmetry rejection, as 
shown by high p values of the “no shift” hypothesis, never rejected in the last row of the table. 
Results in the upper part of Table 4 confirm the findings of Section 3: the data source 
affects the estimates of the policy reaction to cyclical conditions. With OECD and HP the 
policy is weakly a cyclical, while with EC and RT it is weakly counter cyclical. 
                                                                          
21  See European Commission (2006). 
22  The lack of significance of time effects in good times and their significance in bad times may contribute to the 
no switch rejection with EC and OECD HP. 18 
 
5.  Extending the “core” model 
In Sections 2 4 we abstracted from a number of specific variables included in our sample 
of 12 studies, in order to focus on what we called “core” components of the fiscal rule – the 
dependent variable and the initial conditions of public finances. In this Section we add, when 
feasible, the additional variables used and found significant in this group of studies. The aim is 
to understand, in a common framework, how important these variables are and to what extent 
they modify the conclusions reached in Sections 3 4. 
In this version of the paper, we are able to include, in addition to the variables used in 
the regressions presented in Table 4, four groups of explanatory variables. First, in order to 
capture the impact of European fiscal rules on the behaviour of the countries in excessive 
deficit, we introduce a regressor, fm (referred to as the Maastricht variable) which defines a 
benchmark correction of the primary balance which is essentially a function of the excessive 
deficit  and the  number  of  years  in  which  the  latter  needs  to  be  eliminated.
23  Second,  the 
relevance of the electoral cycle is assessed by using three dummy variables. They are equal to 
1, respectively, in the year of regular elections (fe1), defined as those held at the end of a full 
term, in the year before (fe2), and in the year of unexpected (snap) elections (fe3).
24 Third, the 
ex  ante  real  interest  rate  (measured  by  the  nominal  three month  interest  rate  minus  the 
expected rate of inflation) is addedd in order to allow for the interaction of fiscal and monetary 
policies. In fact, this variable (labelled fmonpol) can be considered as a simple proxy of the 
monetary conditions under the assumption that central banks control short term interest rates 
(see,  e.g.,  Faini,  2006).  Finally,  two  dummy  variables,  for  “commitment  states”  and 
“delegation states” (fcom and fdel), refer to a well known classification of budgetary institutions 
(as set out in Hallerberg, 2004), and a synthetic indicator (frule) captures the overall set of 
national level numerical fiscal rules.
25 
                                                                          
23  The  Maastricht  variable  is  set  equal  to  zero  in  the  years  before  1992  or  if  the  deficit  is  below  the  3% 
threshold. For the years 1992 96, it is equal to the difference between the deficit and 3% of GDP, divided by 
the number of years leading up to 1997 and then reduced by the expected change in interest expenditure in the 
following year. After 1996, the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact (in principle, also of its 2005 
version) require countries to correct an excessive deficit in the year after its official recognition, which usually 
occurs with a one year lag. Therefore, in the first year that an excessive deficit occurs, the excess deficit is 
divided by the constant 2 and, in the following years, by one. See Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) for further 
details. 
24  Details concerning the election dummies are in Golinelli and Momigliano (2006). 
25  We wish to thank Alessandro Turrini and Laurent Moulin for kindly supplying the data concerning the overall 
index  used  in  the  regression.  For  information  concerning  the  original  source  and  the  aggregation 
methodology, see Ayuso i Casals et al. (2007). 19 
Table  5  presents  a  set  of  estimates  analogous  to  that  of  Table  4,  but  includes  the 
additional variables mentioned above. The results broadly confirm the conclusions drawn on 
the basis of Table 4. The main differences are: 
(a) The  evidence  of  asymmetric  fiscal  behaviour  becomes  stronger;  the  null  of  policy 
symmetry is rejected for all data sources. 
(b) We find large asymmetries (often individually significant) in the coefficients of many of 
the additional explanatory variables. This strengthens the conclusion, already reached on 
the basis of the “core” model, that the asymmetric cyclical effects operate through a 
general shift of the model parameters. 
(c) The evidence of counter cyclical behaviour with real time data becomes clearer. 
(d) The (stabilizing) reaction to the lagged debt with ex post data is weaker. 
(e) Time effects are less significant (except for the results with real time data). 
Overall, though the inclusion of eight additional parameters in the splitted samples may 
entail some inefficient estimates, there is a remarkable increase of the explanatory power of 
the enriched rule, as documented by the increase of about 20 30% in all the measures of 
goodness of fit. In order to improve the readability of the results, Table 5 reports in bold the 
estimates that are 10% significantly different to zero. The increase to 10% of the significance 
level of the t tests tries to take in account the loss of efficiency due to the inclusion in the 
model of a number of (possibly) irrelevant explanatory variables. We refrained from “fine 
tuning” the model specifications to allow full comparability between the enlarged specification 
adopted in this section with the “core” model used above. 
More  in  detail,  the  significance  of  the  inclusion  of  the  regular  electoral  dummies 
(prevalently affecting policies in good times) is warranted by the results of a joint test for the 
presence of an electoral cycle; this finding is independent from the data used. Snap elections 
seem to exert some relevant effects only using ex post data. 
The Maastricht variable is significant only in case of bad times; however, the limited 
number of cases of excess deficit in good times does not allow for valid inferences.
26 Table 6 
reports the detail about data availability in good and bad times. Note that negative estimates of 
the Maastricht variable parameter suggest that a country in excess of deficit further adjusts its 
                                                                          
26  The same can be said for the snap elections. Note also that the shift towards counter cyclicality would also 
emerge by simply adding the Maastricht variable, alone, to the “core” model. 20 
finances  with  respect  to  what  would  be  implied  by  the  parameters  of  the  fiscal  initial 
conditions. 
The estimates of the parameter measuring the effect of the monetary policy stance vary 
in significance across different sources of data. The prevalently negative sign suggests (as in 
IMF, 2004 and in Galí and Perotti, 2003) that fiscal and monetary policies are substitutes: 
when monetary policy is tight, discretionary fiscal policy loosens with respect to what it would 
otherwise be. The small magnitude of the estimates implies that the fiscal policy is only a very 
slight substitute for monetary policy. 
The results for the variables capturing the role exerted by budgetary institutions and 
fiscal rules seem to suggest that “commitment” strategies may be relatively more successful in 
solving the common pool problem inherent in budget preparation, but only in bad times. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Whether discretionary fiscal policies act counter  or pro cyclically and whether their 
reaction is symmetric or asymmetric over the cycle are still largely unsettled questions. The 
different results obtained by the empirical literature may in principle depend on the model of 
policy decisions used, the estimation procedures adopted, the countries included in the sample, 
the periods of time analyzed, or the source of data selected (including different vintages of 
data from the same source). 
In  this  paper  we  restrict  our  attention  to  a  subset  of  relatively  homogeneous  papers 
presenting  econometric  evidence  on  the  euro area  countries  and  assess  the  role  of  all  the 
factors  mentioned  above  in  a  common  empirical  context  in  order  to  disentangle  their 
relevance. 
In the first part of the paper we assess the impact of different choices in modelling fiscal 
behaviour. We focus on the “core” components of the fiscal rule – the dependent variable and 
the  initial  conditions  of  public  finances  –  finding  in  the  studies  reviewed  three  basic 
specifications of fiscal behaviour. We show that these fiscal rules – whose regressors are only 
the  initial  conditions  of  public  finances  (debt  and  deficit)  and  the  output  gap  –  lead  to 
significant differences in the estimates of the parameter measuring the reaction to cyclical 
conditions. In particular, comparing the first model (CAPB) – used in most empirical studies – 
with  the  second  (CAPB/PB),  the  latter  suggests  a  more  countercyclical  behaviour.  The 21 
difference can be ascribed to the different notions of fiscal policy cyclicality embodied in the 
fiscal rules (net or gross of the reaction to the lagged effects of automatic stabilizers). 
For the third model (PB), the assessment of the cyclical reaction of discretionary policies 
based on eq. [5] reflects a third notion of cyclicality. Such an assessment, depending on the 
characteristics of the series of the output gap, may give results entirely different from those 
based on the first or second model. 
This part of the paper shows the need for extreme caution in comparing empirical results 
based on different models. In our opinion, there is often insufficient awareness of these issues 
when the estimates of the output gap parameter of the different studies are used in the policy 
debate. 
In the second part of the paper we focus on the first of the three models and examine the 
impact of time period and source of data on the estimates. In particular, we estimate rolling 
regressions with a fixed window of 15 years over the period 1978 2006 for four alternative 
datasets: three of them are based on ex post data sources and the fourth largely on real time 
data, available only for the reduced 1988 2006 period. The results suggest that: 
a)  The different data sources have sizeable effects on the estimates of the reaction of fiscal 
policy to cyclical conditions. In particular, ex post data from AMECO and real time data 
indicate weakly counter cyclical policies while the other ex post data sources broadly 
suggest a cyclicality. Overall, we do not find support for the frequently upheld notion of 
pro cyclical fiscal policies.
27 
b)  Independently of the data source we use, a slight tendency towards more pro cyclical (or 
less  counter cyclical)  behaviour  emerges  over  time.  This  result  contrasts  with  other 
papers, which find a shift from pro cyclicality to a cyclicality after the Maastricht Treaty 
(Wyplosz, 2006; IMF, 2004; Galí and Perotti, 2003). 
c)  The effect of the fiscal initial conditions (lagged debt and deficit) on policies is strongly 
significant. This evidence suggests caution when using inferences on the cyclical response 
of fiscal policies based on models omitting these regressors. 
d)  Testing for asymmetries in fiscal behaviour, we find contrasting results, depending on 
both ex post data sources and sample periods. We also find that the asymmetric behaviour 
                                                                          
27  An example is the following statements, from OECD (2007): “Fiscal policy has not contributed to stabilising 
the cycle in the euro area. When the economy was above potential at the start of the decade several fiscal 
authorities did not allow the automatic stabilizers to operate fully as they used cyclical tax receipts to finance 
tax cuts and expenditure increases…[ ]More systematic investigations using longer time series confirm the 
observation that fiscal policy tends to act pro cyclically in euro area countries”. 22 
of the discretionary policy, when present, entails shifts in all the parameters of the rule 
and not only in the output gap parameter. 
In  the  final  part  of  the  paper  we  extend  the  basic  model  to  include  the  additional 
variables found significant in the group of studies we reviewed. This was possible only for 
some regressors, due to data limitations. This extension determines a substantial increase in 
the explanatory power, but the conclusions reached on the basis of the “core” fiscal reaction 
function are generally confirmed. The only important differences are that policy asymmetry is 
now found for all data sources and that the evidence of counter cyclical behaviour with real 
time data is clearer. 23 
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Appendix 
Results based on GMM-sys and alternative estimators 
GMM  estimators  are  typically  used  to  obtain  consistent  parameter  estimates  in  the 
context of dynamic single equations with panel data. However, GMM may be subject to large 
finite sample biases when available instruments are weak (see e.g. Bond, 2002). Specifically, 
this problem occurs using GMM dif when data are highly persistent. 
All variables used in the core specifications of our study show relevant persistence: the 
autoregressive parameters of primary balance, output gap and debt are in the range 0.7 0.9 
(details are available upon request). Therefore, we expect that pooled OLS, whithin groups 
and GMM dif estimates be biased. In particular, Blundell and Bond (1998) suggests that the 
lagged dependent variable parameter OLS estimate is likely to be upward biased, while the 
within group and GMM dif estimates are likely to be downwards biased. As a consequence, 
also the other parameter estimates (i.e. those of the output gap and the debt) will be biased in a 
direction that depends on the covariances of model variables. 
Table A1 reports the estimates of the CAPB s Model using the following approaches: 
GMM sys, pooled OLS, within group and GMM dif.
28 Data used are ex post measures. All 
GMM estimates are one step, which is a standard practice in the empirical literature in view of 
the very modest efficiency gains from two step estimators and of the lower reliability of their 
asymptotic  distribution  approximations.  Regarding  the  choice  of  the  instruments,  GMM 
estimates in the columns 5 8 use the subset spanned by lags from t–2 to t–3 (the same as that 
used in Tables 2a and 2b), while columns 9 12 report estimates from the alternative subset 
spanned by lags from t–2 to t–4. 
The validity of the additional moment conditions exploited by GMM sys with respect to 
GMM dif is subject to the condition that the means of the relevant series be constant within 
each  country.  This  assumption  is  more  acceptable  in  models  with  time  effects,  as  their 
presence  entails  means  that  are  constant  once  the  series  are  expressed  as  deviations  from 
period specific averages, i.e. that the country means evolve over time in a common way. This 
is another reason to add the time dummies in our models, beyond those given in the main text. 
Estimation results in Table A1 are in line with the main predictions found in the literature, see 
e.g. Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond (2002). In fact, pooled OLS present the highest 
estimate of the autoregressive parameter (defined as fcapb+1, and equal to about 0.81), while 
                                                                          
28  Qualitatively similar outcomes could be reported for all the other models used in this study. 27 
the within group persistence estimate is lower (about 0.75). GMM sys estimate stay in the 
middle (about 0.8) of the overestimating pooled OLS and underestimating within group. Such 
range is small, reflecting: the low individual effects variability (only about 10% of the total 
unexplained heterogeneity)
29 and the relatively long time span. Indeed, our span of about 30 
years is probably enough to prevent large negative biases, as the bias of the within groups 
estimates in dynamic panel models is inversely proportional to the number of time periods (see 
Nickell,  1981;  Judson  and  Owen,  1999;  and  Attanasio  et  al.,  2000).
30  Due  to  the  data 
persistence  noted  above,  GMM dif  estimates  of  the  autoregressive  parameter  are  heavily 
underestimated, because they rely on weak instruments. 
Other  parameter  estimates  are  consistent  with  the  assessment  above:  for  example, 
GMM dif debt parameter estimates seem unreasonably high and this fact may be related to 
their underestimation of the autoregressive parameter, which measures policy persistence. 
The  output  gap  parameter  estimates  in  models  without  time  dummies  are  always 
significantly  pro cyclical.  As  also  shown  in  Tables  2a  and  2b,  the  introduction  of  time 
dummies shifts all the estimates towards counter cyclicality (but does not involve significant 
changes in the other model estimates and in model diagnostics). We interpret this result as 
reflecting an omitted variable bias in the coefficient of the output gap. This interpretation is 
supported by the fact that the inclusion of additional regressors (see Section 5) weakens both 
the significance of time dummies and the policy pro cyclicality. 
The choice of instrument subsets does not affect estimates (the last four columns of 
Table A1 report estimates that are almost undistinguishable from those in the previous four 
columns)  but  it  influences  outcomes  of  the  Sargan  overidentification  restriction  test.
31 
Therefore, the estimation results in Table 2a and 2b can be considered not largely affected by 
mild 5% (but almost never 1%) overidentifying restrictions rejections. In addition, note also 
that  the  differences  Sargan  statistics,  testing  for  the  validity  of  the  additional  moment 
conditions of the GMM sys, accepts their validity with high p values: lagged first differences 
are informative instruments for the endogenous variables in levels. 
                                                                          
29  If the individual effects variability had been high, we would have expected the pooled OLS residuals to be 
positively autocorrelated because of the individual effects omission, while here the autocorrelation tests never 
reject the hypothesis of white noise residuals (see the results in the first column of Table A1). 
30  We also use shorter samples (only 15 years). In these cases the bias of within group estimator may be larger. 
31  Therefore, the rejection of the Sargan test using lags t–2 and t–3 as instruments cannot be ascribed to lag t–2, 
as it enters both subsets of instruments. Instrumenting with only the subset t–3 and t–4, i.e. omitting lag t–2 as 
if  it  was  not  valid  because  of  measurement  errors  (see  Blundell  and  Bond,  1999),  delivers  results  (not 
reported) that are very similar to those with instruments from t–2 to t–4. 28 
Overall, main results in this appendix can be summarised as follows. 
First, the estimation method matters for the parameter outcomes. Biases in the estimation 
of the autoregressive parameters (here, they are badly underestimated by GMM dif) induce 
biases in the other model parameter estimates. Estimates in Table A1, interpreted in the light 
of the basic results of the literature, lead to the presumption that GMM sys estimator is the 
best performing method. 
Second, notwithstanding the mild rejection of overidentifying restriction tests, we find 
that the choice of instrument subsets does not affect estimates. Therefore, we set the lags from 
t–2 to t–3 as instruments for all the estimates in the present paper. In this regard, note that 
Sargan tests for shorter time spans or for more complex models (e.g. allowing for policy 
asymmetries or for more regressors) never reject the null of valid instruments. 
 





Table 1 – The Cyclical Reaction of Fiscal Policies in a Homogeneous Group of Recent Studies 
(1) 
Studies  Countries  Period  Data  Additional variables  Asymmetry   Cyclicality  
             
Annett (2006)  EMU 11  1980 2004 (272)  OECD  Fiscal governance & elections  n.a.  Pro cyclical (ante Maastricht) 
a cyclical (post Maas.) 
(2) 
Debrun & Kumar (2006)  OCSE 13  1990 2004 (224)  OECD  Fiscal rules & political v.  n.a.  Pro cyclical (some specifications) 
(3) 
European Commission (2006)  EMU 11  1980 2005 (251)  EC (AMECO)  dummies: >91 e >98  asymmetry 
(4)  A cyclical (o.gaps<0) pro cyclical (o. gaps>0) 
(4) 
Golinelli & 
Momigliano(2006)  EMU 11  1988 2006 (209)  real time   Maastricht var. & elections  symmetry  Counter cyclical  
Wyplosz (2006)  EMU 10  1980 2005  OECD  none 
(5)  n.a.  Pro cyclical (ante Maastricht) 
a cyclical (post Maast.) 
CEPII (2005)  EMU 10  1981 2005  OECD  none  symmetry  Acyclical 
Balassone & Francese (2004)  EU,USA,JAP  1970 2000  EC (AMECO)  none  symmetry 
(6)  Pro cyclical 
Forni & Momigliano (2004)  EMU 10  1993 2003 (110)  real time   Maastricht var.  asymmetry   Counter cyclical (o.gaps<0) a cyclical (o. gaps>0) 
IMF (2004)  EMU 11  1982 2003 (242)  OECD  Monetary gaps 
(7)  symmetry  Pro cyclical (ante Maastricht) 
a cyclical (post Maast.) 
Galí & Perotti (2003)  EMU 11  1980 2002 (238)  OECD  Monetary gaps  n.a.  Pro cyclical (ante Maastricht) 
a cyclical (post Maast.) 
Ballabriga & 
Martinez Mongay (2002) 
individual 
EMU 10  1979 1998  EC (AMECO)  none  n.a.  A cyclical (overall assessment of individual reg.) 
Brunila & 
Martinez Mongay (2002)  EU  1970 1997  EC (AMECO)  none 
(8)  n.a.  Pro cyclical 
 
(1) Highly preliminary, do not quote. We refer to the 5 percent level of significance in our assessment of the reported results. 
(2) We refer to the specification which includes 
country dummies in Table 5 of the paper. 
(3) We refer to Table 3 of the paper; other results presented by the authors tend to indicate, for most specifications, a cyclicality. 
(4) 
The evidence of asymmetric behaviour and the assessment concerning cyclicality, in line with the conclusions drawn in the paper, take into account both the estimates for the 
constant and for the coefficient of the output gap. The coefficient for the output gap has roughly the same value irrespective of cyclical conditions (good or bad) and would 
indicate a cyclicality 
(5) We refer to column 3 of Table 2a of the paper. The specification does not include the lagged deficit. 
(6) Balassone and Francese (2004) conclude in 
favour of asymmetry on the basis of an equation with the overall balance as dependent variable. For the sake of comparability with the other studies we use the results of the 
equation with the primary balance (also reported by the authors), where the asymmetry is not significant. 
(7) We refer to the results of the upper part of Table 2.8 of the 
Appendix 2.4. The study examines the role of other regressors in separate analyses. 
(8) We refer to Figure 6.7 (also published in European Commission, 2001) which shows the 
results of a regression involving, as dependent variable, the changes in CAPB, and as regressors, a constant and the output gap. The analysis refer only to episodes where over 




Table 2a – Estimates of Alternative Fiscal Rules with Time Effects 
(1) 
  explanatory output gap in t  explanatory output gap in t–1 
Model:  CAPB-s  CAPB/PB-s  PB-s  CAPB-l  CAPB/PB-l  PB-l 
Dependent variable:  D D D DCAPBit  D D D DCAPBit  D D D DPBit  D D D DCAPBit  D D D DCAPBit  D D D DPBit 
fcapb  –0.203      –0.203     
  (0.035)      (0.035)     
  –5.81      –5.73     
fpb    –0.195  –0.206    –0.198  –0.191 
    (0.036)  (0.037)    (0.036)  (0.037) 
    –5.40  –5.55    –5.52  –5.14 
fdebt  0.009  0.009  0.010  0.009  0.009  0.009 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
  3.48  3.35  3.60  3.47  3.45  3.32 
f
C
gap  –0.042      –0.031     
  (0.040)      (0.039)     
  –1.06      –0.79     
f
C/P
gap    0.034      0.054   
    (0.040)      (0.039)   
    0.85      1.39   
f
P
gap      0.093      –0.001 
      (0.041)      (0.040) 
      2.24      –0.02 
average mi 
(2)  –0.145  –0.214  –0.092  –0.156  –0.179  –0.132 
  (0.394)  (0.397)  (0.407)  (0.396)  (0.396)  (0.410) 
  –0.37  –0.54  –0.23  –0.39  –0.45  –0.32 
Observations = N´T  300  300  300  300  300  300 
T   27.27  27.27  27.27  27.27  27.27  27.27 
Sargan’ test 
(3)  0.0127  0.0138  0.0055  0.0152  0.0117  0.0036 
Autocorrelation 
(4)   0.3921  0.3726  0.4032  0.3765  0.3954  0.3996 
R squared 
(5)  0.2971  0.2817  0.1584  0.2906  0.2900  0.1659 
Time effects significance 
(6)  0.0242  0.0347  0.0000  0.0136  0.0156  0.0000 




(7)          –0.042 
(7)  –0.036 
(8) 
          (0.040)  (0.041) 
(1) GMM sys estimates, see Blundell and Bond (1998), over the 1978 2006 period. Below each point estimate, the 
corresponding standard error is in brackets and the Student’s t is in italics. 
(2) Average of the 11 country effects 
estimates. 
(3)  Over identifying restrictions  test,  p values. 
(4)  Residuals’  2
nd  order  autocorrelation  test,  p values. 
(5) Proxied by the squared correlation between actual and fitted values. 
(6) Test for the null hypothesis that all the 28 
time dummies are jointly zero, p values. 





above, and w = 0.4825, i.e. the sample average of wit (the semi elasticity of primary balance w.r.t. the output gap 
stemming from automatic stabilizers; source, see Girouard and André, 2007). 





pb estimated above, and w = 0.4825, i.e. the sample average of wit (the semi elasticity of 
primary balance w.r.t. the output gap stemming from automatic stabilizers; source, see Girouard and André, 2006). 
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Table 2b – Estimates of Alternative Fiscal Rules without Time Effects 
(1) 
  explanatory output gap in t  explanatory output gap in t–1 
Model:  CAPB-s  CAPB/PB-s  PB-s  CAPB-l  CAPB/PB-l  PB-l 
Dependent variable:  D D D DCAPBit  D D D DCAPBit  D D D DPBit  D D D DCAPBit  D D D DCAPBit  D D D DPBit 
fcapb  –0.201      –0.217     
  (0.032)      (0.032)     
  –6.35      –6.73     
fpb    –0.207  –0.223    –0.219  –0.170 
    (0.034)  (0.036)    (0.033)  (0.035) 
    –6.17  –6.11    –6.67  –4.83 
fdebt  0.011  0.011  0.014  0.011  0.011  0.011 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
  4.24  4.09  4.79  4.23  4.24  3.88 
f
C
gap  –0.105      –0.096     
  (0.030)      (0.030)     
  –3.53      –3.18     
f
C/P
gap    –0.030      0.001   
    (0.033)      (0.032)   
    –0.93      0.03   
f
P
gap      0.069      –0.073 
      (0.036)      (0.034) 
      1.95      –2.15 
average mi 
(2)  –0.559  –0.550  –0.669  –0.547  –0.556  –0.626 
  (0.173)  (0.175)  (0.190)  (0.176)  (0.176)  (0.188) 
  –3.23  –3.15  –3.53  –3.12  –3.16  –3.33 
Observations = N´T  300  300  300  300  300  300 
T   27.27  27.27  27.27  27.27  27.27  27.27 
Sargan’ test 
(3)  0.0261  0.0288  0.0080  0.0391  0.0331  0.0048 
Autocorrelation 
(4)  0.4293  0.3856  0.5207  0.3644  0.3737  0.5018 
R squared 
(5)  0.1969  0.1845  0.1395  0.1751  0.1766  0.1579 




(6)          –0.105 
(6)  –0.085 
(7) 
          (0.031)  (0.032) 
(1) GMM sys estimates, see Blundell and Bond (1998), over the 1978 2006 period. Below each point estimate, the 
corresponding standard error is in brackets and the Student’s t is in italics. 
(2) Average of the 11 country effects 
estimates. 
(3)  Over identifying restrictions  test,  p values. 
(4)  Residuals’  2
nd  order  autocorrelation  test,  p values. 
(5) Proxied by the squared correlation between actual and fitted values. 
(6) See footnote 7 to Table 2a. 
(7) See 
footnote 8 to Table 2a. 
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Table 3 – CAPB–l Model Estimates with Alternative Data Sources 
(1) 
Source:  OECD  HP 
(2)  EC  RT 
(3) 
fcapb  –0.220  –0.205  –0.158  –0.167 
  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.047) 
  –4.88  –4.59  –3.75  –3.60 
fdebt  0.011  0.011  0.009  0.010 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
  3.51  3.63  2.93  3.18 
f
C
gap  –0.054  0.007  0.086  0.141 
  (0.044)  (0.053)  (0.065)  (0.091) 
  –1.22  0.12  1.34  1.54 
avg. mi 
(4)  –0.555  –0.425  –0.384  –0.140 
  (0.404)  (0.396)  (0.454)  (0.414) 
  –1.37  –1.07  –0.85  –0.34 
N´T  209  209  200  209 
T   19.00  19.00  18.18  19.00 
R squared 
(5)  0.2832  0.2836  0.2653  0.2910 
(1)  GMM sys  estimates,  see  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998),  over  the  1988 2006  period.  Below  each  point 
estimate, we report the corresponding standard error (in brackets) and the Student’s t. 
(2) Data for the initial 
conditions are from OECD; data for output gap are obtained using HP filtered GDP levels. 
(3) Real time data 
based  on  OECD  Economic  Outlook,  see  Golinelli  and  Momigliano  (2006). 
(4)  Average  of  the  11 
country effects estimates. 
(5) Proxied by the squared correlation between actual and fitted values. 
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Table 4 – CAPB–l Model Estimates in Good and Bad Times 
with Alternative Data Sources 
(1) 









(2):  bad  good  bad  good  bad  good  bad  good 
fcapb  –0.216  –0.161  –0.171  –0.238  –0.186  –0.169 
  (0.039)  (0.056)  (0.054)  (0.072)  (0.055)  (0.047) 
  –5.56  –2.85  –3.16  –3.30  –3.38  –3.62 
fdebt  0.012  0.011  0.009  0.016  0.011  0.011 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003) 
  3.75  2.49  1.67  3.43  2.07  3.17 
f
C–l
gap  –0.062  0.036  0.037  0.142  –0.047  0.09  0.105  0.214 
  (0.050)  (0.095)  (0.081)  (0.118)  (0.068)  (0.102)  (0.116)  (0.171) 
  –1.24  0.38  0.46  1.20  –0.70  0.88  0.90  1.25 
avg. mi 
(3)  –0.384  –0.107  1.016  –0.630  0.560  –0.222 
  (0.413)  (0.431)  (1.460)  (0.419)  (1.363)  (0.445) 
  –0.93  –0.25  0.70  –1.50  0.41  –0.50 
                 
N´T  209  110  90  113  96  209 
T   19.00  10.00  8.18  10.27  8.73  19.00 
R squared
 (4)  0.2856  0.3015  0.2767  0.3290  0.3046  0.2906 
Time eff. 
(5)  0.0372  0.0080  0.2447  0.0034  0.3650  0.0038 
No switch 
(6)  0.0985  0.0002  0.0236  0.0709 
0.098  0.105  0.137  0.109  Shift 
(7) 
0.3953  0.4632  0.2638  0.8259 
(1) GMM sys estimates, see Blundell and Bond (1998), over the 1988 2006 period. Below each point estimate, we 
report the corresponding standard error is (in brackets) and the Student’s t. 
(2) Bad times: when GAP £ 0; good 
times: when GAP > 0. 
(3) Average of the 11 country effects estimates. 
(4) Proxied by the squared correlation 
between actual and fitted values. 
(5) Test for the null hypothesis that all the 18 time dummies are jointly zero, 
p values. 
(6) P values of the test for parameters (excluding 
l   C
gap f ) being equal in the two sub samples of good and 
bad times, i.e. for the restrictions collapsing 2SA to 2PA. (
7) First row: estimate of the difference
l   C
gap b
l   C
gap g f f - - - -  in 
good and bad times; second row: p values of the test for the coresponding difference being zero (i.e. for the 
“no shift” hypothesis). 
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Table 5 – CAPB–l Model with Additional Explanatory Variables 
(1) 









(2):  bad  good  bad  good  bad  good  bad  good 
  Explanatory factors of the “core” model (initial fiscal conditions and output gap): 
fcapb  –0.158  –0.206  –0.165  –0.178  –0.176  –0.173  –0.217  –0.160 
  (0.053)  (0.056)  (0.053)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.050)  (0.057)  (0.052) 
  –2.98  –3.70  –3.11  –3.06  –3.08  –3.44  –3.83  –3.09 
fdebt  0.010  0.002  0.009  0.004  0.012  0.008  0.012  0.013 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
  2.48  0.44  2.36  0.79  2.84  1.58  3.12  2.74 
f
C–l
gap  –0.041  –0.084  0.065  0.037  –0.033  0.036  0.169  0.315 
  (0.049)  (0.104)  (0.0790)  (0.122)  (0.063)  (0.099)  (0.087)  (0.177) 
  –0.83  –0.81  0.82  0.30  –0.52  0.37  1.94  1.78 
  The effect of the electoral cycle (regular and snap elections) 
(3): 
fe1  –0.479  –1.274  –0.465  –1.065  –0.312  –1.102  –0.300  –1.251 
  (0.232)  (0.338)  (0.256)  (0.333)  (0.258)  (0.294)  (0.227)  (0.340) 
  –2.06  –3.76  –1.82  –3.20  –1.21  –3.75  –1.32  –3.68 
fe2  –0.320  –0.624  –0.045  –0.509  –0.258  –0.540  –0.109  –0.652 
  (0.229)  (0.331)  (0.252)  (0.327)  (0.241)  (0.311)  (0.221)  (0.307) 
  –1.40  –1.88  –0.18  –1.56  –1.07  –1.74  –0.49  –2.12 
fe3  –0.336  –0.519  –0.453  –0.416  –0.365  –0.378  –0.084  –0.339 
  (0.277)  (0.487)  (0.269)  (0.560)  (0.277)  (0.417)  (0.273)  (0.441) 
  –1.21  –1.07  –1.68  –0.74  –1.32  –0.91  –0.31  –0.77 
  The effect of the “Maastricht variable” 
(4): 
fm  –0.652  –1.153  –0.611  –0.717  –0.658  –0.456  –0.574  0.329 
  (0.143)  (0.849)  (0.143)  (0.542)  (0.139)  (0.329)  (0.140)  (0.877) 
  –4.54  –1.36  –4.28  –1.32  –4.71  –1.39  –4.09  0.38 
  The effect of the monetary conditions 
(5): 
fmonpol  –0.050  –0.122  0.032  –0.014  –0.033  –0.148  –0.112  –0.048 
  (0.054)  (0.077)  (0.060)  (0.104)  (0.053)  (0.076)  (0.058)  (0.066) 
  –0.92  –1.58  0.54  –0.13  –0.62  –1.94  –1.93  –0.72 
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  The role of fiscal institutions 
(6): 
fcom 
(6)  0.688  –0.176  0.582  0.059  0.639  –0.128  0.300  –0.066 
  (0.249)  (0.339)  (0.290)  (0.379)  (0.253)  (0.339)  (0.249)  (0.312) 
  2.77  –0.52  2.01  0.16  2.52  –0.38  1.20  –0.21 
fdel 
(6)  0.110  –0.760  0.172  –0.579  0.169  –0.570  –0.137  –0.041 
  (0.239)  (0.331)  (0.256)  (0.385)  (0.246)  (0.339)  (0.240)  (0.336) 
  0.46  –2.30  0.67  –1.50  0.69  –1.68  –0.57  –0.12 
frule 
(6)  0.181  0.164  0.257  0.163  0.127  0.189  0.135  0.029 
  (0.116)  (0.167)  (0.119)  (0.178)  (0.115)  (0.157)  (0.105)  (0.165) 
  1.56  0.98  2.16  0.92  1.11  1.20  1.29  0.18 
  Other statistics: 
avg. mi 
(7)  –0.769  0.643  –0.491  1.154  –0.852  0.654  –0.448  0.842 
  (0.474)  (1.139)  (0.479)  (1.689)  (0.440)  (1.441)  (0.447)  (1.626) 
  –1.62  0.56  –1.02  0.68  –1.94  0.45  –1.00  0.52 
N´T  127  82  110  90  113  96  108  101 
T   11.55  7.45  10.00  8.18  10.27  8.73  9.82  9.18 
R squared 
(8)  0.427  0.435  0.472  0.368  0.471  0.416  0.533  0.371 
Time eff. 
(9)  0.109  0.186  0.017  0.453  0.086  0.199  0.001  0.081 
  Asymmetry tests outcomes: 
No switch 
(10)  0.0112  0.0001  0.0115  0.0035 
–0.043  –0.028  0.069  0.146  Shift 
(11) 
0.708  0.847  0.557  0.459 
(1) GMM sys estimates, see Blundell and Bond (1998), over the 1988 2006 period. Below each point estimate, we 
report the corresponding standard error (in brackets) and the Student’s t. In bold, estimates that are significantly 
different to zero at 10%. 
(2) Bad times: when GAP £ 0; good times: when GAP > 0. Details about data availability 
over the cycle are in Table 6. 
(3) Election explanatory dummy variables: e1it = 1 occurred in t; e2 it = 1 in t+1; 
e3it = 1 snap elections. 
(4) Explanatory Maastricht variable, see Golinelli and Momigliano (2006). 
(5) Explanatory 
real short term ex ante interest rate. 
(6) Fiscal governance form dummy variables: comit = 1 committment; delit = 1 
delegation. Overall Index of national level fiscal rules (frule), see Ayuso i Casals et al. (2007). 
(7) Average of the 11 
country effects estimates. 
(8) Proxied by the squared correlation between actual and fitted values. 
(9) Test for the null 
hypothesis that all the 18 time dummies are jointly zero, p values. 
(10) P values of the test for parameters (excluding 
l   C
gap f ) being equal in the two sub samples of good and bad times, i.e. for the restrictions collapsing 2SA to 2PA. 
(
11) First row: estimate of the difference
l   C
gap b
l   C
gap g f f - - - -  in good and bad times; second row: p values of the test for 
the coresponding difference being zero (i.e. for the “no shift” hypothesis). 
 36 
Table 6 – Size of Sub-samples Across Data Sources (Full Sample: 1988-2006) 








Total observations, of which:  209  200  209  209 
  in good times  82  90  96  101 
  in bad times  127  110  113  108 
Regular elections in t, of which:  33  32  33  33 
  in good times  13  19  18  17 
  in bad times  20  13  15  16 
Regular elections in t+1, of which:  38  36  38  38 
  in good times  16  17  17  19 
  in bad times  22  19  21  19 
Snap elections in t, of which:  19  18  19  19 
  in good times  6  4  6  9 
  in bad times  13  14  13  10 
Excess deficit cases, of which:  55  52  55  55 
  in good times  7  8  13  2 
  in bad times  48  44  42  53 
Negative ex ante real interest rates, of which:  28  28  28  28 
  in good times  13  15  12  9 
  in bad times  15  13  16  19 
Governance committment cases, of which:  67  67  67  67 
  in good times  23  31  27  31 
  in bad times  44  36  40  36 
Governance delegation cases, of which:  68  68  68  68 
  in good times  24  25  30  30 








Table A1 – CAPB-s Model Estimates Using Alternative Approaches 
(1) 
Instruments:      from t–2 to t–3  from t–2 to t–4 
Estimator:  Pooled OLS  Within Group  GMM-dif  GMM-sys  GMM-dif  GMM-sys 
Time dummies:  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
fcapb  –0.186  –0.188  –0.251  –0.251  –0.506  –0.439  –0.201  –0.203  –0.409  –0.350  –0.202  –0.203 
  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.036)  (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.032)  (0.035)  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.029)  (0.031) 
  –7.01  –6.22  –7.97  –7.05  –8.36  –7.40  –6.35  –5.81  –8.37  –7.38  –6.92  –6.44 
fdebt  0.010  0.008  0.020  0.019  0.080  0.078  0.011  0.009  0.063  0.060  0.011  0.009 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
  3.82  2.93  4.57  3.51  6.84  5.21  4.24  3.48  6.98  5.77  4.17  3.28 
f
C
gap  –0.119  –0.069  –0.097  –0.035  –0.059  0.082  –0.105  –0.042  –0.077  0.037  –0.110  –0.069 
  (0.028)  (0.038)  (0.029)  (0.040)  (0.030)  (0.048)  (0.030)  (0.040)  (0.029)  (0.043)  (0.028)  (0.037) 
  –4.31  –1.81  –3.38  –0.86  –1.98  1.70  –3.53  –1.06  –2.66  0.86  –3.86  –1.85 
average mi 
(2)  –0.498  –0.572  –1.066  –1.485      –0.559  –0.145      –0.543  –0.131 
  (0.172)  (0.526)  (0.269)  (0.532)      (0.173)  (0.394)      (0.172)  (0.393) 
  –2.89  –1.09  –3.96  –2.79      –3.23  –0.37      –3.15  –0.33 
Sargan test 
(3)          0.0000  0.0003  0.0261  0.0127  0.0007  0.0021  0.1045  0.0434 
Dif Sargan 
(4)              0.9999  0.9292      0.9875  0.9725 
1
st order AC 
(5)  0.8569  0.7605      0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
2
nd order AC 
(5)  0.1364  0.1827      0.3871  0.4018  0.4293  0.3921  0.4166  0.4190  0.4309  0.3957 
(1) Time period: 1988 2006, N´T = 300 (=289 for GMM dif because the first observation is lost),  T = 27.3 (26.3 for GMM dif). Below each point estimate, the standard 
error (in brackets) and the Student t. 
(2) Average of the 11 country effects estimates (except for the estimates in differences, i.e. for GMM dif). 
(3) Overidentifying restrictions 
test, p values. 
(4) Difference Sargan test for additional moment conditions embodied by GMM sys, p values. 
(5) Residuals autocorrelation test, p values (not appropriate with 
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(1) The CAPB s and CAPB l Models estimates are indicated by s and l respectively. The first point estimates correspond to the 
1978 92  sample,  the  last  to  1992 2006.  All  the  sub samples  cover  a  fixed  15 year  period.  In  the  first  three  graphs  the  95% 
confidence  intervals  refer  to  the  point  estimate  of  the  CAPB s  Model  corresponding  parameter.  The  fourth  graph  reports  the 
zero interval for both point estimates with the CAPB s and CAPB l Models (as such, it cannot use the standard error of only one 





Figure 1b – CAPB-l Model Estimates with OECD and EC Ex Post Data in Rolling Samples 
(1) 
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(1) The first point estimates correspond to the 1978 1992 sample, the last to 1992 2006. All the sub samples cover a fixed 15 year 
period. In the first three graphs the 95% confidence intervals refer to the corresponding parameter point estimate with OECD data. 
The lower right hand graph reports the zero interval for point estimates with both OECD and EC data sources (as such, it cannot 







































(1) The first point estimates correspond to the 1988 2002 sample, the last to 1992 2006. All the sub samples cover a fixed 15 year 
period. In the first three graphs the 95% confidence intervals refer to the corresponding parameter point estimate with ex post 
OECD data. The lower right hand graph reports the zero interval for point estimates with both ex post and real time data (as such, 
it cannot use the standard error of only the estimate using ex post data, but the average standard error of the estimates with both 
ex post and real time data). 
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Figure 1d – Estimates of f f f f
C–l
gap  





























(1) The first point estimates correspond to the 1978 2002 sample, the last to 1992 2006. All the 
sub samples  cover  a  fixed  15 years  period.  The  95%  confidence  intervals  refer  to  f
C–l
gap 
estimates with ex post OECD data. 
 
Legenda: Source of data: OECD = OECD ex post data; HP = OECD ex post data for initial fiscal 
conditions and HP filterd GDP for the output gap; EC = EC ex post data; RT = real time OECD 
data. 
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Figure 2a – Policy Asymmetry over the Cycle in Rolling Samples - CAPB-l Model 
(1) 
(a) Selection of the most appropriate approach: either two-samples switch (2SA) or 
two-parameters shift (2PA) 
(2) 
 
 OECD data ex post
 OECD data with HP filtered GDP
 EC data ex post
 OECD data real time
 Final year of the rolling window 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
 The two samples switch is prefereed (2SA)
 The two parameters shift is preferred (2PA)
 not available  
 
(b) Policy symmetry test outcomes using the more appropriate approach, 2SA vs 2PA 
(3) 
 
 OECD data ex post
 OECD data with HP filtered GDP
 EC data ex post
 OECD data real time
 Final year of the rolling window 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
 rejects the null of symmetry 
 does not reject the null of symmetry 
 not available  
 
(1)  The first point estimates correspond to the 1978 2002 sample, the last to 1992 2006. All the sub samples 
cover a fixed 15 years period. 
(2)  The 2SA approach is appropriate at 5% (then preferred) when the shifts in both initial fiscal conditions and all 
the model’s deterministic components (country and time fixed effects) are jointly significant. 
(3)  The 5% rejection of symmetric policies (under the null hypothesis) is based on the p value of the most 
appropriate approach (either two samples switch, 2SA, or two parameters shift, 2PA, see panel above) using 




Figure 2b – Estimates of Parameter Difference in Good and Bad Times 






























(1)  The  first  point  estimates  correspond  to  the  1978 2002  sample,  the  last  to  1992 2006.  All  the 
sub samples cover a fixed 15 years period. The lower spline (since 1992) measures the average of the 
f
C–l
gap estimates with ex post data, the upper spline (since 2002) measures the average of the f
C–l
gap 
estimates with real time data. 
 
Legenda: Source of data: OECD = OECD ex post data; HP = OECD ex post data for initial fiscal 
conditions and HP filterd GDP for the output gap; EC = EC ex post data; RT = real time OECD data. 
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